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McQuarrie: The Residential Tenant's Security Deposit - A Protected Interest

THE RESIDENTIAL TENANT'S SECURITY DEPOSITA PROTECTED INTEREST WORTH LITIGATING
CLAUDE M. MCQUARRIE, III
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices.
There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field.'
A recurrent but little noticed or publicized problem in landlord-tenant
relations has been the requirement that the tenant deposit with the landlord
at the inception of the lease a sum of money in addition to the prescribed
rent. Often called a security deposit, the administration of this sum is a frequent source of dissatisfaction for tenants. Too often the resolution of consequent disputes is determined by the party in possession of the money, the
landlord. While the relatively small amounts involved may be minor to
some, for others the amounts are significant, and the costs of appropriate legal
action in terms of time and money are prohibitive.
2
Texas has two statutes that directly bear on security deposit controversies.
While these statutes constitute a laudable effort to remedy the problems
which exist, they are by no means perfect. An analysis of the policy considerations and method underlying the laws reveals that amendments could be
made which would both strengthen the statutes' effectiveness and more
readily accomplish the purposes for which they were enacted.
GENERAL BACKGROUND

The primary function of the tenant's security deposit, or as it is sometimes
called, his "damage deposit," is to ensure the tenant's faithful performance
of all the terms and covenants of the lease.8 The most common arrangement
allows the landlord at the end of the lease term to retain that part of the
security deposit which represents the value of the damages sustained as a result of the tenant's having failed to perform one or more of the lease
covenants. Depending on the construction of the lease, however, other uses
may be made of a deposit. 4 Some leases provide that the deposit constitutes
advance rent,5 while others provide that the deposit will serve as liquidated
1. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
2. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Supp. 1976-1977); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Supp. 1976-1977).
3. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PRoPEtTy 231[2], at 273 (1976).
4. Id. at 273-76.
5. Id. at 274.
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damages should the tenant fail to perform. 6 In all cases the desired effect
of the security deposit is the creation of an incentive to the tenant to fulfill
his obligations under the lease, with the return of the entire deposit upon
complete performance ideally being the reward.
The rights and duties of the landlord and tenant with respect to the security
deposit are generally fixed by the terms of the lease. In the past, common
law principles of contract have determined disputes over the return of security
deposits, 7 although in recent years the content and construction of leases have
been increasingly regulated by statutes. Illustrative of the common law approach is the decision in Orgain v. Butler,8 rendered before Texas had
enacted any statutes governing security deposits. In Orgain the tenants,
seeking refund of their security deposits, pleaded conversion,9 but the court
allowed recovery on the contractual theory that the tenants had performed
their obligations under the lease and were therefore entitled to performance
by the landlord. 10 In general, the landlord is entitled to retain the deposit
until the tenant has made all payments and discharged all other lease obligations secured by the deposit."
The relationship created by the transfer of possession of the security
deposit is one that, while a matter of importance in the event of the landlord's
insolvency, 1 2 is often not addressed and infrequently agreed upon. The three
most common categories given recognition are debtor-creditor, pledgorpledgee, and trustee-beneficiary.'"
This question has on occasion been
settled by statute,' 4 but more frequently the matter has been left to the
courts.' 5 The relationship most favorable to the lessor is generally regarded
6. Id. at 273. Liquidated damages provisions are becoming increasingly rare
because landlords realize their damages may exceed in value the amount of the deposit
and, significantly, because some courts have refused to recognize such clauses. See
Roberts v. Dehn, 416 S.W.2d 851, 853-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); 2 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 231[2], at 273-74 n.8 (1976).
7. See In re Inwood Hardware Corp., 101 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Tex. 1951);
Christianson v. Mincoff, 164 P.2d 344, 347-48 (Mont. 1945); Orgain v. Butler, 478
S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ).

8. 478 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ).
9. Id. at 612.
10. Id. at 613.
11. See id. at 615; Commagere v. Anderson, 417 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1967, no writ).
12. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY T 231[2], at 273 (1976).
13. Id.; Harris, A Reveille to Lessees, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 412, 413, 416, 421 (1942).
The article by Harris contains an excellent discussion of each type of relationship,
pointing out the relative advantages and disadvantages of each and comparing the
three.
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (West Supp. 1976-1977) (trustee-beneficiary); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) (trustee-beneficiary).
15. E.g., In re Morrison-Barnhart Motors, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ohio
1956); Cummings v. Freehold Trust Co., 191 A. 782, 783 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1937);
Mendelson-Silverman, Inc. v. Malco Trading Corp., 260 N.Y.S. 881, 882 (Sup. Ct.
1932).
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to be debtor-creditor,' 6 while trustee-beneficiary is generally the most advan7
tageous to the tenant.'
Generally the landlord holds the security deposit subject to very few constraints. Unless prohibited by statute or by the terms of the lease, a landlord
may commingle a security deposit with his own funds.' s A recent trend,
however, has been to limit the landlord's use of security deposits by regulatory legislation requiring the landlord in certain instances to place the security
deposit in a separate account, 19 an interest-bearing account, 20 or simply to
pay interest on the deposit directly to the tenant. 2 ' In accordance with the
terms of the lease, the landlord is generally entitled to make deductions from
the security deposit at the lease's termination to pay for any damages to the
premises beyond the usually undefined "normal wear and tear" and for any
unpaid rents.
Abuse by both parties may take many forms. A tenant may cause damage
necessitating repairs costing more than the amount of the deposit. In such
instances, if the security deposit serves as liquidated damages, the landlord
must bear the added expense of the repairs. Even without a liquidated damages clause the landlord still would be faced with the expense and trouble
of instituting suit for waste or breach of contract. 22 Landlord abuse usually
takes three forms: (1) requiring an excessively large amount as a deposit,
(2) making excessive deductions from deposits for unspecified or vaguely
2
defined damages, and (3) failing to return the deposit upon termination. 8
Tenants have been especially vulnerable to excessive deductions and withholding of their deposits because of the prohibitive expense of litigation and
the inconvenience involved, particularly when they have moved to a distant
location.
In 1972 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 24 (URLTA).
16. Harris, A Reveille to Lessees, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 412, 413 (1942).
17. See id. at 421-23, 425.

18. See United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 97 S.E.2d 403, 410 (S.C.
1956).
19. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49 (West Supp. 1977); MIcH. COMP. LAws §
554.604(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1138(4)(1) (Callaghan Supp. 1976)); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAw § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (West'Supp. 1976-1977).
21. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49(2) (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-

18 A.(1) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. GEN. OBLIO. LAw § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 19761977).
22. Courts often ignore liquidated damages provisions, allowing the landlord to
recover actual damages in addition to the deposit. Roberts v. Dehn, 416 S.W.2d 851,
854-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); Smith v. Navarro, 69 S.W.2d 794, 795
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934, no writ).
23. Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program for Achieving Real Tenant
Goals, 11 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 18-19 n.93 (1976).
24. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT [hereinafter cited as

URLTA].
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The Act contains several provisions that apply to security deposits and reduce
the possibility for abuse, but those provisions by no means eliminate all potential for abuse. The measures include a prohibition against a tenant's waiver
of the rights given him by the Act 25 and a prohibition against the landlord's
using in the lease any provisions prohibited by the Act. 20 To enforce the
prohibition against the landlord's inclusion of an illegal provision, the Act provides for punitive damages and attorneys' fees. 27 Other provisions include
a limitation on the amount a landlord may demand as a security deposit; 28
written itemization by the landlord of damages which justify deductions; 29
limitation on the time within which a landlord must refund the deposit or
deliver the itemization and balance, if any; 0 and in the event of the landlord's noncompliance, actual and punitive damages as well as attorneys'
fees.8 ' Notably absent from URLTA's provisions are a ban on the landlord's
commingling of the security deposit with his own funds and a requirement
that the landlord pay to the tenant interest on the sum.
The persistence of consumer-oriented legislators and organizations has resulted in a widespread recognition of the need for security deposit legislation,
and most jurisdictions in the country now have such laws. 8 2 They vary
widely in their scope and available remedies,"8 yet they represent a very real
change in governmental attitudes toward landlord-tenant relations.
THE TEXAS SECURITY DEPOSIT STATUTE

In 1973 the Texas Legislature enacted article 5236e, the first security
deposit statute in the history of the state. 84 The avowed purpose and scope
25. Id. § 1.403(a)(1).
26. Id. § 1.403(b).
27. Id.§ 1.403(b).

28. Id.§ 2.101(a).
29. Id. § 2.101(b).

30. Id. § 2.101(b).
31. Id.§ 2.101(c).
32. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. H§ 38-12-101 to -103 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49
(West Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAws H9 554.601-.616 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
26.1138(l)-(16) (Callaghan Supp. 1976)); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw H§7-103, -105, -107
(McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Supp. 19761977); see Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program for Achieving Real
Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 19 n.95 (1976).
33. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-18 (Supp. 1975), with PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, H9 250.51la-.512 (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977), and Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5236e (Supp. 1976-1977).
34. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Supp. 1976-1977). Some credit for the
bill's passage is claimed by the Texas Apartment Association [hereinafter referred to as
the TAA], a state-wide, nonprofit trade organization whose membership consists primarily of apartment owners, property management companies, and vendors of apartment
industry goods and services. Interview with Clemence Clay, Executive Assistant to the
Executive Director of the San Antonio Apartment Association, in San Antonio, Nov. 16,
1976.
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of the Act was to establish the "rights, duties, and remedies of residential

landlords and tenants in regard to tenants' security deposits."3 5 The detail
in which these rights, duties, and remedies are set out compares favorably
36
in scope and depth with similar statutes of other jurisdictions.
Definitions
The first section of article 5236e is devoted to definitions, of which three
are particularly noteworthy. The first defines "security deposit" and contains
two important points.8 7 First, it limits a security deposit to "any advance
or deposit of money, the primary function of which is to secure full or partial
performance of a rental agreement for a residential premises." 38 Second, the
exclusion of advance rentals 9 clarifies the intended distinction between a sum
of money intended to secure full and complete performance of the agreement
and a sum which serves as consideration for the agreement itself.
The only reported appellate case to date involving article 5236e turned
on the issue of whether the disputed sum qualified as a security deposit. In
Holmes v. Canlen Management Corp.40 the tenant attempted to recover a
sum paid pursuant to a clause in the lease that identified the sum as a "nonrefundable painting and cleaning fee." In affirming the trial court's summary
judgment for the landlord, the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals held that
'[the money was either an advance payment of rent or a consideration for
the execution of the lease."'4 1 In rejecting the tenant's argument that the
lease's language effectively established a security deposit, the court's interpretation of the statute was a strict one. 42 Nevertheless, latitude for interpre35. Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 433, at 1182 (Title of Act).
36. How well its provisions, in spite of their detail, protect tenants' security deposits
as compared to other similar statutes is another matter. Compare CoLo. REy. STAT. §
38-12-101 to -103 (1973), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49 (West Supp. 1977), and TEX.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Supp. 1976-1977).
37. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 1(I) (Supp. 1976-1977).
38. Id. Obviously excluded from the outset are security deposits incident to leases
of commercial property. Further, it would appear that a pledge of any chattel other than
money as security for the performance of a lease agreement would fall outside the
statute.
39. Id.
40. 542 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
41. Id. at 202.
42. Id. at 201-02. In his affidavit in opposition to the landlord's motion for
summary judgment, the tenant urged that regardless of the lease's description of the sum,
its primary function was to secure full or part performance of the lease. Id. at 200.
While the facts of the Holmes case are unclear, it may be argued that where a lease
requires both a nonrefundable sum to be retained for cleaning and that the tenant
surrender the premises in a clean condition, the nonrefundable sum in effect secures
performance and therefore meets the definition of TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e,
§ 1(1) (Supp. 1976-1977). Two such terms in the same lease would at least have to be
viewed as inconsistent with each other. The Oregon statute specifically excludes "clearly
designated" nonrefundable fees from the meaning of "security deposit." OR. REV. STAT.
§ 91.760(1) (1975).
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tation depending upon the facts in each case is afforded by the use of the
48
descriptive term "primary function" in the statutory definition.
Additional interpretative problems may be presented by other provisions
in standard-form security deposit agreements4 4 and related standard-form
leases. 45 One example is the insertion of a covenant requiring the tenant
to thoroughly clean the apartment, 46 combined with a provision allowing the
landlord to retain a specified sum as a "fixed cleaning charge" to "be deducted in any event for special cleaning which must be done commercially
or by owner's employees."' 47 In effect, the security deposit agreement would
place the label "fixed cleaning charge" on the nonrefundable fee of Holmes
and on what, in the form, is a part of the tenant's "security deposit." It is
arguable that the portion automatically deducted from the sum entitled
"security deposit" is nevertheless a security deposit within the meaning of
article 5236e since it is a sum of money intended to secure performance of
a portion of the rental agreement, specifically the agreement to thoroughly
clean the apartment. 4"
The fixed cleaning charge deduction could also be applied, in a practical
sense, to deterioration resulting from normal wear and tear, notwithstanding
the "special cleaning" language used in some standard-form lease agreements. 49 A provision of article 5236e5 ° suggests, however, that the legislature intended that a landlord be allowed to retain a portion of the security
deposit only upon his showing that, insofar as the physical condition of the
premises is concerned, damages beyond normal wear and tear exist. Another
43. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 1(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).

44. For a representative standard form, see Texas Apartment Association Official
State Form 71B (rev. Aug. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the TAA Security Deposit
Agreement Form]. The form is provided to TAA members for their optional use in
lease agreements.
45. For a representative standard-form lease, see Texas Apartment Association
Official State Form 71A (rev. Aug. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the TAA Rental
Agreement Form]. Like the TAA Security Deposit Agreement Form, the Rental

Agreement Form is provided to TAA members for their optional use in lease agreements.
Paragraph 4 of the Rental Agreement Form incorporates the Security Deposit Agreement
Form as a part of the total lease agreement.
46. TAA Security Deposit Agreement Form, supra note 44, 6.
47. Id. 8.
48. In construing ambiguous leases drafted by landlords, courts usually construe
them most strongly against the landlord. See Orgain v. Butler, 478 S.W.2d 610, 615
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ).
49. In the case of the TAA standard forms, this conclusion is suggested by the
language that "[tihis charge does not relieve resident from the cleaning provisions of
paragraphs 6 and 7 above," which allow deductions for cleaning of such items as

"carpets, draperies, furniture, walls, etc., soiled beyond reasonable wear."

words, if the tenant fails to clean the apartment thoroughly, as is required by

In other
6, and

deductions are taken pursuant to
7 for violations thereof, deductions under
8 for
"special cleaning" can be little else but a charge for what remains: normal wear and
tear.

TAA Security Deposit Agreement Form, supra note 44, 8.
COV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 3(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).

50. TEx. REv.
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provision states that the requirement of such a showing may not be waived.5 1
Through the use of a fixed cleaning charge, the purpose of the statute may
thus be frustrated by the landlord's doing indirectly what he is prohibited
from doing directly.
The fixed cleaning charge deduction may not be a direct violation of the
statute under the reasoning of Holmes because arguably it does not secure
any performance of the tenant's lease obligations and because the freedom
of contract principle should permit the parties to formulate their own agreement. At a minimum, however, the use of such a provision by a landlord
in a preprinted, standard-form lease appears to be a convenient circumvention of the legislature's intent. Instead of an unscrupulous landlord's having
to risk legal retaliation for his wrongful retention of all or a part of his
tenants' security deposits, all he need do now is require a "fixed cleaning
charge," which, under the reasoning in Holmes, would be labeled either consideration for the agreement or advance rent for unspecified "special cleaning.",5 2 Further, a fixed cleaning charge may be deducted without regard
to whether special cleaning is actually needed or performed, thus providing
the landlord with the opportunity of turning it into a windfall. Such a situation would appear again to violate the intent of article 5236e: that deductions
from security deposits serve only as compensation to the landlord for repairs
and cleaning beyond normal wear and tear. An additional bonus for the
landlord is that he need no longer haggle with the tenant over the reasonableness of deductions; the tenant is now contractually bound to forfeit that part
of his security deposit which is specified by the lease as deductible in any
event.
The term next defined in article 5236e is "landlord."' 3 The provision is
significant to the consumer in that not only is the owner included in the term
but so is any legal entity shown on the lease as a managing or leasing agent.
Any difficulty that a tenant may formerly have encountered when told by
the manager that he would have to deal with the owner is eliminated by this
definition. Further, any disputes between the owner and managing agent
over liability for a violation of article 5236e are precluded from becoming
a problem for the tenant since either may be asserted to be the landlord.
The final definition of significance is that of "normal wear and tear."'5 4 By
using a negative definition, however, the statute only narrows what can be
a vague and difficult subject. The key word used is "deterioration," but what
that term includes is open to interpretation. It could be argued that any
51. Id. § 7.
52. See Holmes v. Canlen Management Corp., 542 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
53. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 1(2) (Supp. 1976-1977).
54. Id.§ 1(6).
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moderate accumulation of dirt, marks on walls, and splattered grease on
kitchen walls, for example, is deterioration which occurs through the reasonable, intended use of the premises. On the contrary, it may be contended
that "deterioration" does not involve simple household dirt. A Missouri court
held that deterioration, as applied to a commodity, required the following:
a constitutional hurt or impairment, involving some degeneration in
the substance of the thing . . . . The mere soiling . . .resulting in
a purely superficial hurt or impairment removable by the simple process of cleansing, cannot be said to be a deterioration of the commodity
within the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of that term. 55
In contrast, a Texas court held that the word "deteriorate" was "sometimes
used as a synonym for the word 'decline' "in describing market value.5 6
Obligations of the Landlord and Tenant During the Tenancy
The landlord's obligations with respect to a security deposit during tenancy
are contained in subsection 2(b). 57 More safeguards are omitted from this
section than are included in it, since the only requirement is that the landlord
keep accurate records. He is not prohibited from commingling the security
deposit with his own funds, nor is he required to pay interest on the sum
to the tenant during or upon termination of the tenancy. 58 The danger of
exposure of the tenant's funds to the landlord's creditors is alleviated by the
second part of the subsection, which places "[tihe tenant's claim to the security deposit. . . prior to any creditor of the landlord, excluding a trustee
in bankruptcy."' 9
The statute also outlines certain duties of the tenant that condition the
landlord's duty to refund the deposit. Section 6 requires the tenant to leave
a written forwarding address with the landlord.60 Failure to do so does not
result in a forfeiture of the deposit, but the duties of the landlord regarding
refund do not arise until the forwarding address is made available to the landlord. 6 1 A further provision of the statute prohibits the tenant's withholding
55. Rosen-Reichardt Brokerage Co. v. London Assurance Corp., 264 S.W. 433, 436
(Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
56. Laxson v. Scarborough, 221 S.W. 1029, 1030 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1920, writ ref'd).
57. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 2(b) (Supp. 1976-1977).
58. In this regard, the statute is much more favorable to the landlord than the
statutes of some other jurisdictions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49 (West Supp.
1977); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 554.604(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1138(4)(1) (Callaghan Supp. 1976)); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
59. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 2(b) (Supp. 1976-1977). The
corresponding Oregon statute expressly includes a trustee in bankruptcy in the category
of those whose claims are subordinate to that of the tenant. OR. REv. STAT. § 91.760(2)
(1975).
60. Tax. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 5236e, § 6(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).

61. Id.
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payment of rent under a claim that the security deposit may serve in lieu
62
thereof, and it imposes a treble damage provision for such a violation.
Additional duties are placed on the tenant by the statute. He must give
any advance notice of surrender required by the lease agreement, so long
as that requirement is underlined or conspicuously printed in the lease agreement.6 8 In a subtle way, subsection 3(a) permits the landlord to place
any other duties he may wish on the tenant. It allows deductions for
"charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the rental agreement
or as a result of breaching the rental agreement."4 In a practical sense,
therefore, the statute allows performance of each of the lease provisions to
become a condition to the tenant's right to obtain a refund of his deposit.
This result is not unreasonable so long as all the lease provisions are themselves reasonable. While the statute is silent concerning the possibility of
unreasonable provisions and their effect on the landlord's obligation to
refund the tenant's security deposit, charges must nevertheless be reason65
able.
Landlord's ObligationsAfter Termination of the Tenancy
The landlord has two basic duties with regard to the tenant's deposit upon
the termination of the tenancy. First, he must refund the deposit within
thirty days after the tenant has surrendered the premises. 6 6 In the event of
a deduction from the deposit, the second duty arises. Instead of being required to refund the full amount, the landlord need only refund the balance,
but in lieu of the deducted portion "a written description and itemized list
of all deductions" must accompany the refund. 7 While subsection 3(a) does
not expressly state that the thirty-day requirement also applies to the itemization, a reading of subsection 4(c) confirms such an inference.6 8 In the
event of a dispute over the reasonableness of damages or charges, the burden
of proof is placed on the landlord.69
The statute's provisions as to permissible deductions are, perhaps of necessity, general in nature. Deductions may not be made for normal wear and
tear, 70 and for this reason the construction of "normal wear and tear"
becomes important. Whether the need for a repainting of the interior constitutes normal wear and tear may depend upon the length of the tenancy.
62. Id. § 6(b).

63. Id. § 2(a).

64. Id. § 3(a).
65. Id. § 3(a).
66. Id. § 2(a).
67. Id.§ 3(a).

68. Compare id.
§ 3(a), with id.
§ 4(c).
69. id.§ 3(a).
70. Id.
§ 3(a).
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Interpretation is more difficult, however, in the realm of cleaning. If a carpet needs shampooing, a floor needs scrubbing, or a dirty oven needs scouring, whether a lease may allow deductions therefor or whether a landlord may
make such deductions in the absence of such a provision is questionable. If
such conditions are "deterioration which occurs, based upon the use for which
the rental unit is intended," they constitute normal wear and tear 7' and are
therefore unavailable to the landlord to justify deductions. 72 Any attempt
to provide in the lease for deductions from the security deposit for normal
wear and tear is voided by section 7.73
Interpretation of cleaning requirements in lease agreements can be a
source of confusion to both landlords and tenants. In a monthly trade publication of a Texas Apartment Association (TAA) affiliate organization,
readers were advised that cleaning fees resulting from normal wear and tear
could not ordinarily be deducted from security deposits. 74 Assuming that the
cost of cleaning is included in the rerltal (because it results from normal wear
and tear), and since a lease provision purporting to waive any right under
article 5236e is void, the language of the typical security deposit agreement
form could be seriously misleading, if not altogether unenforceable. In the
TAA Security Deposit Agreement Form, 75 for example, paragraph 6 requires
"the apartment . . . be cleaned thoroughly," and in accordance with the
landlord's move-out cleaning instructions, if provided.7 6 Paragraph 7 then
71. Id. § 1(6).
72. Id. § 3(a).
73. Id. § 7.
74. THE APARTMENT NEws, June 1976, at 16, where it is stated:

A common misconception of apartment managers is the thinking that the
resident must return the apartment in such condition that it can be immediately rerented. If you rented an auto you would not be expected to wash the car 'in the
driveway of the rental agency, before returning it to the check-in counter. The cost
of washing and servicing the auto is included in your rental fee. The same should
be true of the apartment rental.
Ordinarily, cleaning fees may not be deducted from security deposits.

75. In pertinent part, it reads:
The deposit(s) will be refunded only after each and all of the following conditions
have been met ....
6. CLEANING REQUIREMENTS: The apartment, including furniture and
kitchen appliances, must be cleaned thoroughly. MOVE-OUT CLEANING INSTRUCTIONS (if provided) shall be followed.
DEDUCTIONS FROM TOTAL SECURITY DEPOSITS
7. FAILURE TO CLEAN. If resident fails to clean in accordance with the above
paragraph, reasonable charges to complete such cleaning shall be deducted, including charges for cleaning carpets, draperies, furniture, walls, etc., soiled beyond reasonable wear.
8. FIXED CLEANING CHARGE. The following charge will be deducted in
any event for special cleaning which must be done commercially or by owner's em-

ployees: $
. This is applicable only if owner has a fixed cleaning
charge. This charge does not relieve resident from the cleaning provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

TAA Security Deposit Agreement Form, supra note 44,
76. Id. T 6.
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allows deductions for noncompliance with paragraph 6, adding the description
"soiled beyond reasonable wear."' 77 Requiring one to clean an apartment,
including such kitchen appliances as a refrigerator and an oven, "thoroughly"
(and in accordance with what the move-out cleaning instructions may require) yet only to the extent that it is "soiled beyond reasonable wear"
is inconsistent. The net effect of such language could mislead the tenant into
believing that he must surrender the premises in a "thoroughly cleaned" condition or else suffer the deduction of charges therefor, in addition to the fixed
cleaning charges, if any, for "special cleaning." A broader perspective of the
matter shows that the owner, attempting to keep rents low enough to maintain a satisfactory occupancy rate, is able to cut overall costs by having his
outgoing tenants, either through their labor or their security deposits, assist
him in reconditioning the apartments. Owners would quickly point out
abuses by some former tenants necessitating repairs and refurbishment at a
cost exceeding the security deposit, but such a protest would be tantamount
to justifying a policy requiring all tenants to pay for the sins of a few. Of
course, such a policy relieves the landlord of the time and expense of pursuing the proper legal remedies on occasions when abuses do occur.
The uncertainty and resulting ambiguity in security deposit clauses could
be eliminated by a judicial construction of the "normal wear and tear" definition found in subsection 1(6). It is important to remember that one of
a consumer's interests is knowing how much he is paying and what he is paying for. Some landlords' response to an interpretation that cleaning charges
may not be deducted from security deposits undoubtedly would be to raise
rents. 78 At least then the consumer-tenant would be able to more realistically compare prices and goods. The counterargument is that the assumed
higher rents would penalize those who would rather clean their apartments
than pay the higher rates.
The primary provision authorizing deductions is in subsection 3(a), which
allows them for "damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable
under the rental agreement." 79 Presumably this provision codifies the concept that the function of a security deposit is to secure the covenants to which
the tenant agrees in the lease. In that connection the tenant is well-advised
to read all documents before signing any of them so that he will know in
advance what those covenants are. Therein lies another problem, however,
because few laymen possess sufficient knowledge to understand fully the legal
77. Id. 7.
78. See Campbell, CongratulationsSurvivors!, THE APARTMENT NEWS, Sept. 1976,
at 12, 13. Mr. Campbell, himself an apartment owner, wrote:
Watch consumerism, it will grow. The problems that you face will get worse. It
is going to cost you money and if you don't add it to your rents it is going to come
straight out of your pocket. It is a hassle and will continue to be a hassle.
Id. at 13.
79. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 3(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
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effect of a lengthy and finely-printed legal document containing technical and
unfamiliar terms and cross references to other paragraphs. Neither does the
average tenant wish to pay for the services of an attorney merely to review
a lease. Even worse, written leases today usually are preprinted, nonnegotiable forms that the tenant knows in advance he must sign in order to acquire
adequate housing. Leases may also acquire the nature of adhesion contracts
during periods of housing shortages, when landlords' bargaining positions are
strengthened by the knowledge that they need not bargain or negotiate.80
Remedies for the Landlord'sNoncompliance
Section 4 of the statute prescribes the tenant's remedies for the landlord's
noncompliance with the duties imposed by the statute. Subsection (a) allows
damages treble the amount of any portion of a deposit wrongfully and in bad
faith withheld plus a one hundred dollar penalty and attorneys' fees.8 ' Subsection (b) provides that a landlord's bad faith failure to furnish the "written
description and itemized list of damages and charges" required by section 3
forfeits the landlord's right to withhold any portion of the deposit and to sue
the tenant for damages to the premises. 82 In a tenant's suit to recover all or
a part of a deposit deducted without itemization of the charges by the landlord, the landlord's liability is reduced to the amount withheld plus payment
of -thetenant's attorneys' fees.8 8 Subsection (c) emphasizes that the landlord
must have acted in bad faith before the tenant may recover any of the prescribed penalties.8 4 A presumption that the landlord acted in bad faith
arises when he has failed to comply within thirty days, -thus partially easing
the tenant's burden of proof.8 5 One may only assume that the statutory
language "within 30 days" means within thirty days of the tenant's surrender
of the premises, which is the explicit requirement of subsection 2(a).86 It
80. An excellent account of an extensive research effort concerning the problems
and deleterious effects attendant to the usage of the standard-form lease is found in
Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L.

REV.

247 (1970). The year 1976 was predicted to be the worst year for the apartment
construction industry since 1962, yet nationwide occupancy rates were high even in
traditionally soft and heavily overbuilt areas. THE APARTMENT NEWS, Aug. 1976, at 11.
Occupancy rates in San Antonio, currently subject to strong market demand, are
increasing and recently ranged from 92 to 95%. Dennis, The State of Our Industry, THE
APARTMENT NEWS, Aug. 1976, at 17.
The national vice-president of the National
Apartment Association suggests caution regarding the near term and mild optimism for
the long term recovery and growth of the multifamily housing industry. Rein, A
Premature Postmortem, THE APARTMENT NEws, Sept. 1976, at 14. See also Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 825 (Pa. 1974).
81. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 4(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
82. Id. § 4(b).
83. Id. § 4(b).
84. Id. § 4(c).
85. Id.§ 4(c).
86. Id. § 2(a).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol8/iss4/11

12

McQuarrie: The Residential Tenant's Security Deposit - A Protected Interest

COMMENTS

1977]

may be argued, however, -thatthe passage of the thirty days required to establish a prima facie case of bad faith is in addition to the thirty-day period in
which the landlord is required to -refund the deposit or to furnish the description of damages and charges. That argument would be based on the
reasoning that something more -than a mere failure to perform a duty is required to establish that such a failure resulted from bad faith. The "something more" would be the additional thirty-day period for that failure to
run, perhaps in the face of -a demand or protest by the tenant, which would
alert the landlord to his failure to comply. 87 While the former interpretation
is probably correct, the ambiguity nonetheless may not properly be ignored.8 8
The strong remedies afforded the tenant by section 4 are an attempt to
deter abuses by landlords. Tenants, however, should not be lulled into the
complacent expectation of an automatic award of all the prescribed damages;
the statute is likely to be construed as permitting the court's award of the
damages rather than requiring it. The Austin Court of Civil Appeals in
Mallory v. Custers9 construed the damages provision of the Deceptive Trade
Practices--Consumer Protection Act90 (DTPA) as being only permissive, not
mandatory, 9 1 and the language of section 4 of article 5236e is no more indicative of a mandatory award than is the language of the DTPA.92 Article
5236e could be strengthened, therefore, by the addition of a provision that
would expressly remove any discretion in this area.
Other Provisions
Section 5 protects the tenant's security deposit in the event the owner's
interest in the premises ceases. Upon the occurrence of such an event, the
new owner assumes the old owner's liability with respect to the tenant's security deposit on the date title is acquired.9 3 Curiously, real estate mortgage
lienholders who acquire title at foreclosure are exempted from this provi87. It is not suggested here that a demand or protest is even impliedly required by
the statute.
88. The corresponding Pennsylvania statute is worded so that there is no requirement of showing bad faith, and the landlord's liability (double the amount wrongfully
withheld) arises after 30 days from the date of termination or surrender and acceptance
of the premises. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512(c) (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977). The
corresponding New Mexico statute does not require a showing of bad faith, and the
landlord's liability (the amount of the deposit due the tenant plus attorneys' fees and
court costs) arises 30 days after the termination of the tenancy. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
70-7-18C, -18D (Supp. 1975).
89.

537 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).

90. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Supp. 19761977).
91. Mallory v. Custer, 537 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no
writ).
92. Compare TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Supp. 1976-1977), with
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 4 (Supp. 1976-1977).
93. TEX. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 5(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
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sion. 94 Because foreclosures on rental property have been common in recent
years, 9 5 it appears that if a tenant desires to protect himself from an unfair
loss of his security deposit, he must assure himself of the soundness of the
owner's financial position prior to his entering into a rental agreement. Not
only would such an act be impractical, if indeed at all possible, but even the
most thorough investigation could not guarantee the safety of the deposit.9 6
Subsection 5(b) provides that the former "owner remains liable for security
deposits received by the owner" until the new owner notifies the tenant in
a subscribed writing, which acknowledges the receipt and amount of the deposit, that the new owner is responsible for the deposit. 7 This section protects most of the tenant's interests, but the lienholder's exemption creates an
unwarranted gap in the tenant's protection.98

Two additional sections of article 5236e significantly affect the landlord's
and tenant's rights regarding the security deposit. Section 8 preserves for
both parties all rights pursuant to "contract, statute, or common law which
are consistent with the provisions of" the Act. 9 Section 7 declares void and
unenforceable any provision of a rental agreement purporting to exempt
either party "from any liability or duty imposed by" the Act "or which purports to waive the rights and liabilities granted under" the Act. 100 While section 7 provides a remedy to the tenant who is at least as knowledgeable as
his landlord, the uninformed tenant remains vulnerable. Moreover, the section fails to embody any deterrent to the landlord who, with his usual superior
knowledge of the law -and the aid of legal counsel in drafting his standardform lease, might attempt to take advantage of the uninformed tenant. In
a comment following a section of the URLTA that prohibits the inclusion of
94. Id.

95. Foreclosure and bankruptcy are said to have played a "heavy role" not only in
the San Antonio multifamily dwelling market but also in the national market. Fuhrmann, Property Management, the Future, THE APARTMENT NEwS, Sept. 1976, at 35.
96. The argument that a contrary provision would unfairly encumber the lienholder's
interest and result in even tighter mortgage money is only another way of stating that the
tenant should be required to bear one of the landlord's costs of doing business. The
lienholder's risk of loss should be borne financially by the party creating that risk, the
borrowing landlord, through higher lending rates, if necessary, rather than by the
innocent tenant. Another solution would be to require the landlord, before he further
encumbers the property, to deposit with the lienholder an amount similar to the total
of anticipated security deposits. Put simply, a creditor (the tenant) should not have to
absorb a bad debt (owed by the landlord) when the loan (security deposit) was involuntary because of its being a part of an adhesion contract. A comparison of the corre.
sponding Oregon statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 91.760(2) (1975), with TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5236e, § 2(b), 5(a) (Supp. 1976-1977), indicates that the Oregon tenant's
security deposit is not jeopardized in this manner as is that of a Texas tenant.
97. Tax. 'REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 5(b) (Supp. 1976-1977).
98. URLTA '§ 2.101(e) would fill this gap by providing that: "The holder of the
landlord's interest in the premises at the time of the termination of the tenancy is bound
by this section."
99. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 8 (Supp. 1976-1977).

100. Id. § 7.
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certain provisions in rental agreements, 10 1 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws said:
Rental agreements are often executed on forms provided by landlords,
and some contain adhesion clauses the use of which is prohibited by
this section. .

.

. Such provisions, even though unenforceable at law

may nevertheless prejudice and injure the rights and interests of the
uninformed tenant who may, for example, surrender or waive rights
in settlement of an enforceable claim against the landlord for damages .... 102
That section allows the tenant to recover as actual damages an amount of
up to three months' rent and attorneys' fees in the event of a landlord's deliberate use of "a rental agreement containing provisions known by him to be
prohibited.' 1 0 3 Until such a provision is included in article 5236e, deception
and abuse by unscrupulous landlords may be expected to continue undeterred
04
by the present "threat" of unenforceability.
ARTICLE

5236e:

FINISHING THE TASK

The foregoing discussion to varying degrees suggests possible amendments
to several parts of article 5236e. Those suggestions, along with several
ancillary proposals, are summarized here.
The definition of "security deposit" should include a provision which would
expressly exclude any nonrefundable fee agreed upon by the parties. 10 5 Such
a measure would help to avoid the confusion which results from part of a
"security deposit" being nonrefundable.
The definition of "normal wear and tear" should be expanded to include
conditions of accumulated dirt, spillage, and surface deterioration such as
marks on walls, so long as such conditions do not result from unreasonable
causes such as negligence, accident, carelessness, or abuse by the tenant.
Such a specific provision would significantly curtail landlord abuse and more
clearly define the parties' rights and liabilities. Further, it would reduce the
101. Among the provisions prohibited is any agreement which waives any rights or
remedies provided for by the Act. URLTA § 1.403(a)(1).
102. Id. § 1.403, Comment.
103. Id. § 1.403(b).
104. The Commissioners' comment may be directly in point for the tenant who is
party to the present TAA Rental Agreement Form.

At the end of

15 is the following

provision:
If resident prevails in any suit against owner for bad faith detention of security deposit (after lawful deductions), owner shall be liable for court costs and reasonable
attorneys fees, such amount to bear 10% interest from due date.
TAA Rental Agreement Form, supra note 45, 1 15. The voiding by § 7 of article
5236e of this waiver of the tenant's right to the damages which are provided by
subsection 4(a) of the article apparently has not deterred what may be attempts to
mislead uninformed tenants as to their statutory rights.
105. The Oregon statute provides a simple example of such a definition. OR. REv.
STAT. § 91.760(1) (1975).
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opportunity available to the landlord to confuse or mislead the tenant by use
of a preprinted security agreement form.' 0
A provision should be added to prohibit a landlord from inserting any
clauses in the lease that would affect any other "deposits" or other refundable
fees such as the often used "pet deposit." The provision should allow, however, for upward adjustment of the amount of security deposits for reasonable
considerations such as potential damage to the premises beyond normal wear
and tear by pets. The purpose of such a provision would be to ensure that
all sums placed in deposit with the landlord are governed by article 5236e.
The inclusion of nonrefundable fees in a lease agreement should be either
banned altogether or properly regulated to enable the consumer to know the
amount and object of his payments. The freedom of contract principle is
outweighed by the policy consideration of fair dealing. 10 7 If not banned,
appropriate regulation of nonrefundable fees should include several provisions. First, implementing clauses in leases should not be contained in the
security deposit agreement. This would make clear the distinction between
the "nonrefundable fee" and the "security deposit" and would place the nonrefundable fee in its proper perspective, avoiding the confusion resulting from
part of the "security deposit" being nonrefundable. Additionally, implementing clauses should be conspicuous in contrast to the many other lines of fine
print. Further, payment of nonrefundable fees should be allowed only upon
a termination of the lease and only when such termination does not result
from the landlord's default. This requirement is justified because the money
is not to be used by the landlord, if at all, until the apartment has been
vacated. As with all other covenants, its performance would be secured by
the security deposit. Finally, otherwise permissible deductions from the
security deposit for any charges of the same nature as those intended to be
covered by the nonrefundable fee should be allowed only to the extent that
they exceed the nonrefundable fee. This would preclude double recovery
by the landlord.
The amount of security deposit that a landlord may demand should be
limited. A reasonable figure is that suggested by URLTA, one month's
rent. 108 Permissible adjustments for special circumstances would not be included in this figure.
A landlord should be barred from commingling the tenant's security
deposit with his own funds. Such sums should be required to be deposited
in a separate account in a regulated financial institution, with the tenant
106.
107.
108.
1977)

See text accompanying notes 54-56 & 70-77 supra.
See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
URLTA § 2.101(a). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-21.2 (West Supp. 1976(1-1/2 month's rent); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-18A(2) (Supp. 1975) ("reasona-

ble," but not in excess of one month's rent if lease term less than one year).
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being notified of the institution's name and the account number. Many other
states have indicated by similar enactments' 0 9 that landlords' complaints of
excessive burden are either exaggerated or without merit. Interest should
be paid to tenants to the extent that such interest exceeds the reasonable administrative expenses. 110
Subsection 5(a) should be amended to remove the exclusion of real estate
mortgage lienholders from the category of new owners who are liable to the
tenant for the deposit upon their acquisition of title to the premises. There
is no acceptable justification for jeopardizing the tenant's deposit in such a
manner."'
The uncertainty surrounding the time allowed for the landlord to furnish
the written description and itemized list of damages and charges should be
eliminated. This could be accomplished by adding the same language
which establishes a thirty-day requirement in subsection 2(a) to the first sen1 12
tence of subsection 3(a).

The punitive awards allowed by section 4 and subsection 6(b) should be
made mandatory rather than allowed to be construed as permissive by
reticent judges." 83 To deter landlords from vaguely couching their reasons
for making deductions, the damages under subsection 4(b) should be identical to those under subsection 4(a). Otherwise, landlords may escape the
punitive damages simply by providing an insufficient list of deductions.
The ambiguity surrounding the establishment of bad faith by prima facie
evidence of failure to perform "within 30 days" should be eliminated. Both
phrases "within 30 days" in subsection 4(c) should be followed by the phrase
4
used in subsection 2(a), "after the tenant surrenders the premises.""1
Section 7, which voids any attempted waiver of rights or liabilities, should
be strengthened to have a deterrent impact in addition to its present curative effect. The curative measures presently afforded by section 7 are of
little protection to the uninformed and unwitting tenant, who may easily be
confused or deceived by long, complicated, preprinted lease forms. A provi109. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49 (West Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
554.604 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1138(4) (Callaghan Supp. (1976)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:8-19 (West Supp. 1976-1977).

110. Several states allow the landlord to retain part of the interest as compensation
for administrative expenses. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49 (West Supp. 1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (West Supp. 1976-1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.51lb(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1976-1977).

111. Such an amendment would bring the Texas statute into conformity with the
URLTA provision. See URLTA § 2.101(e). For detailed discussion see note 96 & text
accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
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sion such as URLTA subsection 1.403(b) would accomplish the desired
result.1 15
Many legal problems that face the tenant regarding his security deposit are
not embraced by article 5236e. The statute does afford substantial protection to the tenant's rights, but the need for supplemental legislation is evident.
Such amendments may unfortunately be long in coming because it is difficult
for unorganized tenants to compete effectively with well-organized and
influential lobby groups. What the tenant or his attorney might do about
security deposit problems not encompassed by article 5236e during the period
until the needed amendments are enacted requires examination of another
recent law.
THE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT

The Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act" 16 as amended in
1975 protects persons who lease real property for use.' 7 The starting point
for understanding the protection hat the DTPA affords a tenant's security deposit is the federal statute from which it is derived.'1 " Regarding what acts
come within the purview of the DTPA, the Texas Legislature expressly
declared its intent "that in construing. . . this section the courts to the extent
possible will be guided by. . .the interpretations given by the Federal Trade
Commission and federal courts to ,[the federal statute]."" 9 Further, the
construction and application section of the DTPA illustrates the Act's broad
scope.

1 20

Justificationfor Applicability to Residential Tenant's Security Deposit
It is entirely consonant with the underlying purposes of the DTPA that the
Act apply to residential security deposit agreements. The problems which
face the average tenant in the marketplace today are much the same as those
115. See URLTA § 1.403(b).

For detailed discussion see text accompanying notes

100-104 supra.
116. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.

§

17.41-.63 (Supp. 1976-1977).

117. Id. 55 17.44, .45(l)-(4).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). That statute states that "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id.
119.

TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)

(Supp. 1976-1977).

See also

Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 847-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ)
(construing prior deceptive trade practices act).
120. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.

§ 17.44 (Supp. 1976-1977)

reads:

"This

subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes,
which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and
economical procedures to secure such protection."
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faced by any other consumer. Rarely is there an equality of bargaining
power between the prospective tenant and landlord. Standard-form leases,
which the tenant knows are not susceptible to modification, 121 are usually
drafted by knowledgeable attorneys in favor of the landlord's interests whenever the law would otherwise leave room for negotiation. Adhesion clauses
and unconscionable provisions often result, but the unwitting tenant, realizing
he has little choice, submits by signing the usually long and complicated
forms. Moreover, when the consumer-tenant has a problem for which there
is a legal remedy, two disadvantages frequently impair his ability to obtain
relief. First, he is usually uninformed or misinformed as to his rights and
does not assert them; second, even if he were knowledgeable enough to assert
them, traditional remedies are often ineffective because of the prohibitive cost
involved in pursuing an action until relief is ultimately achieved. The
DTPA, therefore, may be used to obtain sufficient relief in a broader range
of factual situations through its punitive damages and injunctive relief provisions. As a result, it can make worthwhile an action against a landlord
when article 5236e would provide insufficient relief or no relief whatsoever.
Provisions Protective of Security Deposits
The protections offered by the DTPA begin with subsections 17.46(a) and
(b) (12). Those subsections together declare unlawful all "[f]alse, mislead122
ing, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"'
including but not limited to the representation "that an agreement confers
or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve,
or which are prohibited by law.' 2 3 This combination of sections seems to
encompass at least one of -the problems cited earlier for which there appeared
to be an insufficient remedy. As an example, a provision misleading the
tenant concerning his rights or purporting to waive the tenant's rights under
article 5236e' 2 4 may fall within the DTPA because it constitutes a representation that the "agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations . . . which are prohibited by law" or because it is confusing or mis121. Paragraph 21 of the TAA Rental Agreement Form, supra note 45, provides
space for special provisions. However, it has been fairly well-established that tenants
rarely attempt to negotiate their leases. Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases:
An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. Rnv. 247, 264-70 (1970). In the Mueller study, only
eight of 100 carefully selected tenants had ever asked for alteration of the security
deposit term in their leases. Id. at 251-52, 288. Of their 13 requests, eight were completely refused, one resulted in a slight modification, and four resulted in a radical
alteration or elimination of the term. Id. at 288.
122. Tax. Bus. &COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
123. Id. § 17,46(b)(12).
124. An example would be a provision that attempts to limit a landlord's liability for
bad faith detention of a security deposit to court costs and attorneys' fees, thereby
attempting to exclude the other, nonwaiveable damages available under article 5236e. See
note 104 supra.
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leading to the tenant. 125 Should other 'acts or practices by landlords become
prohibited under any future amendments to article 5236e, it is probable that
the potential protection of this section will be expanded.
Another protection for the consumer-tenant's security deposit is the pro-

hibition against unconscionable actions 1 26 or any "unconscionable action or
course of action by any person."' 127 Although proving unconscionability no
doubt will be a task of unpredictable difficulty because of the latitude of the
courts' discretion in this area, these provisions may provide remedies where
no other remedy is available. In a recent decision involving landlord-tenant
relations, although not concerning security deposits, the Texas Supreme Court
voided a lease clause that exempted the landlord from any liability for damage to the person or property of the tenant or his family resulting from any
cause whatever. 128 The court's reasoning was that the clause was contrary
to public policy because it resulted from the inequality of the parties' bargaining power.' 29 Recognizing that terms of lease agreements are often dictated
by the landlord, the court acknowledged that a prospective tenant has no
choice but to accept them if he and his family wish to enjoy satisfactory housThe court said that "I[t]he exculpatory agreement
ing accommodations.'
will be declared void, however, where one party is at such disadvantage in
bargaining power that he is practically compelled to submit to the stipulaAs
125. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Supp. 1976-1977).
previously discussed, article 5236e provides for damages in the amount of $100 plus three
times the amount wrongfully withheld and reasonable attorneys' fees in the event of a
bad faith detention by the landlord. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5336e, § 4(a)
(Supp. 1976-1977). Additionally, article 5236e voids, although does not expressly
prohibit, any lease provision purporting to waive this liability. Id.§ 7. Relief is made
available by TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that the use of certain standardform leases might violate a catchall clause of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law, which prohibits "any other fraudulent conduct which
creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding." Commonwealth v. Monumental
Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 826-28 (Pa. 1974), citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-

2(4)(xiii) (Purdon 1971). In Monumental Properties, the State argued that the
landlords' failure to disclose in their leases the existence of statutory remedies available
to the tenants violated the consumer protection law because such a failure constituted an
unfair or misleading practice. The lower court's ruling that the law did not require
disclosure was reversed by the supreme court, whose opinion implied that such a failure,
if misleading or confusing to the tenant, would be a violation. Commonwealth v.
Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 829-30 (Pa. 1974). It could be strongly
argued that a provision which attempts to fix liability below the nonwaiveable statutory
relief goes beyond a mere omission of disclosure, that it represents an affirmative attempt
to confuse or mislead the tenant as to his rights, and that it is therefore actionable under
§§ 17.47 and 17.50 of the DTPA. For an example of such a provision, see TAA Rental
Agreement Form, supra note 45, 15, quoted in note 104 supra.
126. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Supp. 1976-1977).

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. § 17.50(a)(3).
Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex. 1973).
Id.at 889.
Id. at 889.
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tion."' 131 The case indicates, therefore, the supreme court's sensitivity to the
problem of unequal bargaining power confronting many tenants today. It
might therefore be argued that an excessive "fixed cleaning charge" or secur5236e, is unconscionity deposit, regardless of whether in violation of article
2
able and therefore actionable under the DTPA.'1
A more indirect protection accrues to the consumer-tenant under the
provisions of section 17.47 of the DTPA. That section permits the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office to bring suit to enjoin
133
the use of any act or practice which is declared unlawful by the DTPA.
It must first be determined, however, that such proceedings would be in the
public interest before such intervention may occur.18 4 It is possible, therefore, that if sufficient pressure were applied by public-interest groups, the
widespread use of leases that violate the prohibitions of the DTPA and employ proscribed or unconscionable practices could be curtailed. Such a
result has been partially achieved in at least one other jurisdiction having
both a landlord-tenant law and a consumer protection law.' 8 5
Relief Available
The relief that the DTPA provides is contained in subsection 17.50(b), and
it considerably exceeds the relief granted by article 5236e.'8 8 Under the
DTPA the tenant may obtain restitution of the affected property,' 37 three
times the actual damages,'838 attorneys' fees,'8 9 court costs,' 40 injunctive
relief, 14 ' and whatever other relief the court may deem proper.' 42 Indirect
relief is afforded by the civil penalties, which may be imposed by the court
48
when the Consumer Protection Division prevails in its action.'
131. Id. at 889.
132. Unconscionability was also one of the grounds for a suit brought under the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law by the Pennsylvania
attorney general against 25 landlords. The alleged violations included the use of
standard, preprinted form leases containing provisions allegedly illegal, unconscionable,
and unconstitutional. These allegations were held not to have stated a cause of action,
however, since it had not been shown that the provisions complained of were unenforceable in all circumstances. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812,
828-29 (Pa. 1974).
133. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(a) (Supp. 1976-1977).
134. Id.
135. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974). See
notes 125 & 132 supra.
136. Compare Tx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Supp. 1976-1977), with
Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 4 (Supp. 1976-1977).
137. TEx. Bus. & CoMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(3) (Supp. 1976-1977).
138. Id.§ 17.50(b)(1).
139. Id.§ 17.50(b)(1).
140. Id. § 17.50(b)(1).
141. Id.§ 17.50(b) (2).
142. Id.§ 17.50(b)(4).

143. Id. § 17.47(c)-(e).

Evidentiary burdens in such actions are eased by the
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Strengthening the Act
Three minor improvements could be made to the DTPA that would
make its protections of a tenant's security deposit more thorough. First, "unconscionable actions"' 144 should be expressly declared unlawful as are "false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" in subsection 17.46(a). 1 45 Some
unconscionable actions, while perhaps making available consumer remedies
under subsection 17.50(a), are unconscionable not because they are false,
misleading, or deceptive, but because they result in contracts of adhesion.
Such practices, if simply "unconscionable," should be declared unlawful.
A second matter is the wording of subsection 17.46(b)(12). As it is
presently written, it makes unlawful any representations that an agreement
confers rights or obligations that are prohibited by law. A defendant to an
action brought under this section may contend that section 7 of article 5236e
merely voids any attempt to waive rights or obligations established elsewhere
in the statute and that it prohibits nothing. That argument, if successful,
might defeat a security deposit action brought under subsection 17.46
(b)(12) of the DTPA and would thereby seriously undermine the DTPA's
legitimate deterrent effect. That argument could be precluded, however, by
amending the appropriate clause in subsection 17.46(b)(12) to read "or
4
which are prohibited or made unenforceable by law.' 0
Finally, the underlying purposes of the DTPA would be better fulfilled if
subsection 17.50(b) were amended to make all damages listed therein
mandatory. 147 Without the assurance of obtaining those damages, the
wronged tenant will find prosecuting a suit for a small amount unworthy of
his time and expense. This was one of the obstacles that the DTPA was
intended to overcome. The other justification for this amendment is that it
would give forceful effect to the deterrent power of the statute. It is obvious
that landlords will continue to mislead their tenants as to their rights and obligations until pressure is brought to bear on them by the courts. 148 To deny
provisions for civil investigative demands, further indirectly aiding the consumer-tenant.
Id. § 17.61.
144. Id. §§ 17.44, .50(a)(3).
145. Id. § 17.46(a).
146. Id. § 17.46(b)(12) (proposed language italicized).
147. See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra. By comparing the language of §
17.50(c) ("the court may award") to that of § 17.50(b) ("each consumer . . . may
obtain"), it may be argued that the legislature's intent was that damages under §
17.50(b) are mandatory, while those under § 17.50(c) are permissive and that the only
discretion regarding relief under § 17.50(b) is that which is provided by § 17.50(b)(4)
("any other relief which the court deems proper"). Id. § 17.50(b), (c). It is arguable,
however, that the language of § 17.50(a) ("consumer may maintain") militates against
this construction. Id. § 17.50(a).
148. Paragraphs 6 through 8 of the TAA Security Deposit Agreement Form, supra
note 44, quoted in note 75 supra, and the purported limitation of liability in 15 of the
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the damages provided for by the section would be to deprive the DTPA of
much of its efficacy in the entire field of consumer protection.
ARTICLE

5236e

AND THE

DTPA

COMPARED

The remedies available under the DTPA are made supplementary to the
remedies available under article 5236e by DTPA section 17.43.149 The section would expressly defeat the argument that the more specific article 5236e
should preclude an action concerning a security deposit brought under the
DTPA. The greater relief available under the DTPA and the more general
nature of its prohibitions favor alternative pleading. The fact that the DTPA
contains no express "bad faith" requirement as a prerequisite to punitive relief must also be considered. While bad faith is perhaps characteristic of
the acts and practices encompassed by the DTPA and thus perhaps an implied requirement, the distinction could appear in the tenant's burden of proof.
To illustrate briefly the difference in relief offered by the two statutes, a
few examples are useful. One abuse already cited is the inclusion in a residential lease of a clause containing a purported waiver of the tenant's rights
to damages beyond actual injury, court costs, and attorneys' fees in the event
of a wrongful detention of the security deposit. Article 5236e would void
that waiver and make all remedies of section 4 of that article available to
the tenant if the landlord were to retain the deposit in bad faith. 150 By contrast, the DTPA would not only void the waiver, but might also penalize the
landlord's retention of the deposit with all the sanctions made available by
that Act, some of which would not be dependent on a bad faith detention
of the deposit.' 5 ' Thus, the DTPA provides not only additional relief to the
tenant but also a possible deterrent to, and injunctive relief against, a landlord's unscrupulous conduct. The cost to the landlord of attempting to mislead the tenant as to his statutory rights or to deprive him of such rights could
be increased significantly under the DTPA.
Another common abuse occurs where a landlord, when returning to the
former tenant the balance of his security deposit, gives such a vague, general
list of deductions that it is impossible for the tenant to ascertain whether the
deductions were legitimate. In an action under article 5236e the maximum
relief available would be a refund of the amount deducted plus attorneys'
fees. 1 52 An action under the DTPA-should the landlord's conduct prove
to be misleading, deceptive, false, or unconscionable--would again provide
TAA Rental Agreement Form, supra note 45, quoted in note 104 supra, are two examples of provisions that may be confusing and misleading.
149. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. 1§17.43 (Supp. 1976-1977).
150. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, §§ 4, 7 (Supp. 1976-1977).
151. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46, .47, .50 (Supp. 1976-1977).
152. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.r.art. 5236e, § 4(b) (Supp. 1976-1977).
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the wider range of relief made available by subsection 17.50(b) of that
Act.' 58
The possibility of the tenant's abuse should not be overlooked. If a tenant,
after his security deposit has been rightfully retained by a landlord, were to
bring a harassment suit under both statutes against the landlord for its refund,
the landlord would have no affirmative remedy available under article 5236e.
Under the DTPA, however, specific relief would be provided. 5 4 In this respect, the DTPA more broadly protects the landlord's legitimate interests.
A final distinction is illustrated by the situation in which an owner retains,
under a fraudulent claim of right, a security deposit given pursuant to a lease
of a retail store. Article 5236e would be completely inapplicable since it
applies only to residential leases, 155 while the DTPA has no such restriction.

15

CONCLUSION

The Texas Legislature took a very important step in enacting the residential security deposit law, article 5236e. Informed tenants are now significantly less vulnerable to the traditional forms of landlord abuse in this area.
The 1973 Act, however, must be viewed as only the first step toward the
eventual achievement of adequate security deposit protection. That the sums
at stake in each individual case are relatively small does not obviate the need
for thorough and comprehensive protection.
During the interim, however, tenants and their attorneys may properly look
to the DTPA to fill many of the gaps that exist in article 5236e. The
broader scope of conduct encompassed by the DTPA and the more liberal
relief provided make it a potentially excellent tool for the effective administration of justice in security deposit disputes. Together, article 5236e and
the DTPA ensure protection of the security deposit of the informed Texas
residential tenant under most circumstances.
153. Tax. Bus. &COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Supp. 1976-1977).
154. Id. § 17.50(c) (allows court to award reasonable attorneys' fees and court
costs).
155. Tax. REv. Civ. SrAT. ANN. art. 5236c, §§ 1(1), (5) (Supp. 1976-1977).
156. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.45(1), (3)-(6), 17.46(a) (Supp. 19761977).
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